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CAL. E. CARMAN, 
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Appellant. 
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IN THE SUPREI\IB COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM J. JOHNSON and 
PARTICIA JOHNSON, 
Respondents, 
-vs- Case No. 14807 
C. E. CARMAN, aka 
CAL. E. CARMAN, 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
ST A TEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from the lower Court's determination that Respondents' forfeiture 
of all payments made under a Uniform Real Estate Contract upon Respondents' default was 
unconscionable. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
A non-jury trial was held on September 9, 1976, in the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Duchesne County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Robert Bullock presiding. By a 
memorandum decision dated September 13, 1976, the lower Court entered judgment for 
Respondents in the sum of $8,845.00 with interest, determining that to allow Appellant to 
retain this amount as liquidated damages was unconscionable. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the lower Court's decision affirmed. 
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and Respondent entered into a contract for the sale of Appellant's land to 
Respondents on May 3, 1975. Pursuant to the Uniform Real Estate Contract, the 
Respondents were to pay $170,000.00 in installment payments, after an initial down 
payment of $20,000.00, which was paid. The terms provided that Respondents were to pay 
the balance ($150,000.00) beginning on June 15, 1975, at the rate of $1,477,11 per month 
for 12 months. At the end of 12 months a baloon payment of $15,000.00 would be due. The 
monthly payments would remain the same for the second 12 months of the contract, with 
another balloon payment of $7 ,649.36 due at the end of the second 12 month period. The 
remaining balance was to be paid in equal monthly installments of $1,428.57 for the next 
ten years. These final payments included interest at 8 Y2 OJo per annum. 
Respondents performed under the contract until the early part of 1976, when 
Respondents were unable to meet the payments. At this time the parties agreed to alter the 
contract. 
The alteration provided that the contract price would be $150,000.00 even though 
Respondents had in fact paid the $20,000.00 down payment (reducing the balance on the 
original contract to $150,000.00) and substantial other payments. The monthly payments 
were reduced to $1,301.80 and the provision for balloon payments was deleted. The effect 
of this alteration was actually an increase in the total price to be paid, while reducing the 
monthly installments. 
Payments under the altered contract were to begin on April 1, 1976. Respondents made 
the first payment and then became unable to meet any further payments. Respondents 
informed Appellant of this fact in May, 1976. Appellant sent Respondent a demand notice 
and Respondent quit the premises on May 24, 1976. 
. . h . uity however. Respondents approached the Appellant with a request to retain t eir eq • 
Appellant would not agree. Thereafter, on June 3, 1976, Respondents, through counsel. 
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sent a letter to Appellant asking Appellant to quit the premises. Appellant remained in 
possession and this suit was filed on behalf of the Respondents on June 17, 1976. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A LIQUIDATED DAMAGE CLAUSE IS IMPROPER AND AGAINST 
PUBLIC POLICY IN AN INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACT AND 
SHOULD NOT BE ENFORCED. 
This Court has recognized that forfeitures are disfavored under the law. Perkins v. 
Spencer, 121 Ut. 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952). Forfeitures are disfavored for the simple reason 
that forfeitures work as a penalty above and beyond the actual damages under a contract. 
And it is well settled that contract damages are limited to those that are reasonably 
forseeable under the terms of the particular contract. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341 
(1854). 
In some situations, however, Courts have allowed parties to a contract to fix the 
damages in the event of breach in advance. This Court has adopted the position taken by 
the Restatement of Contracts § 339: 
(I) An agreement made in advance of breach fixing the damages there-
fore, is not enforceable as a contract and does not affect the damages 
recoverable for the breach unless: 
(a) The amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of just compensation 
for the harm that is caused by the breach, and 
(b) The harm that is caused by the breach is one that is incapable or 
very difficult of accurate estimation. Perkins v. Spencer, supra. 
the wisdom behind this approach is that it guards against the use of liquidated damages 
provisions as a penalty, while at the same time allowing parties to settle disputes outside the 
judicial process, in appropriate cases. It can readily be seen that an installment land contract 
is not such an appropriate case. 
Paragraph 16A of the Uniform Real Estate Contract meets neither of the criteria set 
forth in § 339 of the Restatement of Contracts. The forfeiture of all monies paid by the 
buyfr is not a reasonable forecast of just compensation in that it fails to take into account 
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any of the criteria concerning actual damages that this Court has endorsed. These criteria 
were set forth in Cole v. Parker, 5 Ut. 2d 272, 300 P. 2d 263, 267: 
(1) Loss of an advantageous bargain; 
(2) Any damage to or depreciation of the property; 
(3) Any decline in value due to change in market value of the property not allowed 
in items number 1 and 2; and 
(4) For the fair rental value during the period of occupancy. 
Paragraph 16A, which is fixed in the contract and not a bargained-for provision, has 
no relationship to damages at all, but rather, has a varying effect subject to the contract 
price, the monthly installments, and the length of time the payments are actually paid. 
Therefore, Paragraph 16A is not a reasonable forecast of just compensation and should not 
be enforced. 
The Court made Findings of Fact pursuant to its memorandum decision finding that 
payments had been made by Plaintiffs to Defendant as follows: 
Down payment 
Payments on principal 
Payments on interest 
Total 
$20,000.00 
3,839.31 
10,756.79 
$34,596.10 
The Court also found that Defendant had sustained damages as follows: 
Interest on $150,000.00 to 
May 24, 1976, at 8Y2% 
per annum 
Benefit of bargain 
Attorney's fees 
Reasonable cost to 
restore premises 
Total 
$14,485.00 
5,500.00 
1,165.00 
4,500.00 
$25,650.00 
00 as liquidated Upon these facts the Court found that the forfeiture of $8,845. 
damages was unconscionable and entered judgment accordingly. 
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A more compelling reason for not enforcing Paragraph 16A lies in the fact that this is 
not a situation in which damages are incapable or very difficult of determination. In fact, 
the test spelled out by this Court in Cole v. Parker, supra, and related cases, provides a 
formula to determine exactly the actual damages to the seller. And this is in fact done under 
this Court's present method of determining unconscionability. 
The Provisions of Paragraph 16A of the Uniform Real Estate Contract meet neither of 
the requirements of § 339 of the Restatment of Contracts. It must meet both requirements 
to be enforceable. Therefore, the provision is against public policy and well settled contract 
principles and must not be enforced. 
POINT II 
UNCONSCIONABILITY IS AN EQUITABLE PRINCIPLE REQUIRING 
CONSIDERATION OF ALL THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 
OF THE CASE. 
Assuming arguendo that this Court fails to find Paragraph 16A per se unenforceable, 
the Court must uphold the lower Court's determination that the operation of Paragraph 
16A worked an unconscionable penalty to the Respondents. 
A finding of unconscionability is not arrived at by a mechanical comparison of figures. 
This Court, recognizing that the heart of the matter is firmly grounded in equity, has looked 
to the totality of the circumstances. 
In Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Ut. 2d 272, 332 P. 2d 989 (1958), the case which Appellant 
contends is controlling, the Court considered factors other than mere figures in determining 
that there was no unconscionability. When the buyer first became in arrears in Carlson, the 
seller offered to forego payments on principal if only the buyer would pay the interest and 
taxes. The buyer was still unable to perform. In addition there was considerable damage 
done to the property. The equities were clearly in favor of the seller, and consequently the 
Court found that a forfeiture of 9Yi0Jo ($119.94) was not unconscionable. 
In Jacobsen v. Swan, 7 Ut. 2d 420, 326 P. 2d 712 (1954), cited in Appellant's brief, the 
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Court found that after carrying the buyer in default for over 18 months, the seller actually 1 
suffered a loss. The Court said. 
(T)he trial Court rightly found that the least to which Plaintiffs were en-
titled were the return of the property and the retention of the amounts 
paid in by Defendants which were far short of making Plaintiffs whole. 
Jacobsen v. Swan, supra, at 716. 
If a determination of unconscionability rests simply upon a sterile comparison of 
figures the entire basis of equity is ignored. A reasoned analysis will reveal that reliance on a 
fixed formula will cause inequitable results. 
First, a Court cannot set a fixed percentage limitation and decide that forfeitures above 
a certain percentage are unconscionable, while those below are not. That is not the nature of 
equity. Second, the same sum of money may be a penalty to one buyer, and not so as to 
another, depending on the circumstances of the particular buyer. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT IS IN THE BEST POSITION TO DETERMINE 
THE EQUITIES OF THE SITUATION AND ITS DETERMINATION 
SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED. 
The trial judge, sitting as trier of fact, heard extensive evidence on the events prior to 
and subsequent to buyers default. Evidence of the alteration of the contract showed that 
Appellant did indeed profit from the alteration. The alteration resulted in a net increase of 
payments to be received by Appellant. 
The trial judge was also aware of the circumstances leading to default. The judge knew 
that Respondent, William J. Johnson, had been disabled in an auto accident shortly before 
the date of default. The default was due to an inadvertent turn of events making it 
impossible for Respondents to meet their obligations. And Appellants have been made 
whole for their actual damages. The trial judge considered all of the relevant equitiei 
involved and determined that the forfeiture was unconscionable. This finding should not be 
disturbed. Even assuming the Court made an error in computing the measure of actual 
damages, this would not change the result, but only the ultimate amount of recovery. 
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CONCLUSION 
Paragraph 16A of the Uniform Real Estate Contract is not enforceable under the 
accepted principles this Court has endorsed with respect to liquidated damages. It is not a 
reasonable forecast of damages, nor is an installment land sale the type of situation suitable 
for liquidated damages. And the enforcement of the forfeiture clause works an 
unconscionable penalty upon Respondents in this case. The trial Court's ruling must be 
affirmed. 
/,I( 
DATED this df1 day of April, 1977. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~~ 
MATT BILJANIC 
Attorney for Respondents 
7355 South 9th East 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondent to Robert M. McRae, attorney for Appellant, 370 East Fifth South, Salt Lake 
Cicy, Utah, 84111, postage prepaid, this~ day of~l977. 
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